Anti-Natalism, Can It Really Exist?

[Acutely decayed]

Quote Originally Posted by Mr. Veech

it belongs to reality as it exists apart from experience. The law of motivation does not apply to it at all. Not only that, the will is incapable of doing anything contrary to its essence given its metaphysical status. This is why Schopenhauer resorts to obscure religious language when describing how the will's denial actually takes place in book IV of WWR. Broadly speaking, I have great sympathy for both Schopenhauer and Ligotti's pessimism. I cannot, however, ignore the fact that there are parts of both worldviews that are philosophically incoherent.

I have not read TPofSR only WWR and Magee's secondary text, I will look at it. The Will as un-individualised and if I understand correctly timeless and without dimensions is straining against coherence (from my perspective anyway) to start with - particularly how that would interact with causality - it was the part of WWR you mention that interested me most though.

A timeless principle impacting causality for continued action irrespective of consequence made me link this part of the book with evolution, partly because of other reading I was doing when I read WWR. The denial of the "Will" and the anti-natalist viewpoint retain a similarity from this viewpoint. I would love to see an informed placement of evolution in Schopenhauer or Nietzsche's philosophy - I am sure it is out there somewhere (though probably beyond my limited comprehension).

[Mr. Veech]

Quote Originally Posted by Acutely decayed

Quote Originally Posted by Mr. Veech it belongs to reality as it exists apart from experience. The law of motivation does not apply to it at all. Not only that, the will is incapable of doing anything contrary to its essence given its metaphysical status. This is why Schopenhauer resorts to obscure religious language when describing how the will's denial actually takes place in book IV of WWR. Broadly speaking, I have great sympathy for both Schopenhauer and Ligotti's pessimism. I cannot, however, ignore the fact that there are parts of both worldviews that are philosophically incoherent. I have not read TPofSR only WWR and Magee's secondary text, I will look at it. The Will as un-individualised and if I understand correctly timeless and without dimensions is straining against coherence (from my perspective anyway) to start with - particularly how that would interact with causality - it was the part of WWR you mention that interested me most though. A timeless principle impacting causality for continued action irrespective of consequence made me link this part of the book with evolution, partly because of other reading I was doing when I read WWR. The denial of the "Will" and the anti-natalist viewpoint retain a similarity from this viewpoint. I would love to see an informed placement of evolution in Schopenhauer or Nietzsche's philosophy - I am sure it is out there somewhere (though probably beyond my limited comprehension).

That actually reminds me of something else regarding Schopenhauer's metaphysics. If you recall in book III of WWR, he maintains that there exist Platonic ideas, entities that exist apart from space, time, and causality. According to Schopenhauer, space and time are what constitute the principle of individuation, i.e., that which explains or accounts for diversity at the level of the phenomenal world. Given that the principle of individuation only applies to the world as representation (the phenomenal world), it's contradictory to state that the aforementioned Platonic ideas even exist. The concept of diversity or even number does not apply at all to the world as will. The Platonic ideas he uses in order to explain his aesthetics occupy an impossible intermediate position.

Another problem, one he admits is a genuine concern, is how to account for the self. Schopenhauer makes a distinction between the subject of knowing, the subject of willing, and the self as object (representation). The subject of knowing is responsible for constituting itself through some obscure from of self-affection. This problem is actually the result of his upholding Kant's transcendental idealism alongside materialism. So, he holds the following to be true:

(1) The phenomenal world is constituted within consciousness.

(2) Consciousness is a product of the brain.

(3) The brain is a physical object which only exists within consciousness.

The result is a paradox which is later explored by Quentin Meillassoux. The problem itself really applies to any philosophy which attempts to "absolutize" a finite subject. Schopenhauer's philosophy is an extreme example.

Your comprehension is not limited, Absolutely Decayed. The fact that you're interested in these things is proof.

[ToALonelyPeace]

Wait. I thought Schopenhauer says the Platonic Idea is representation and therefore subjected to principle of individuation. Here in Book 3, he writes:

Quote

"For, precisely according to Kant, the thing-in-itself is supposed to be free from all the forms that adhere to knowledge as such. It is merely an error of Kant that he did not reckon among these forms, before all others, that of being-object-for-a-subject; for this very form is the first and most universal of all phenomenon, i.e., of all representation."

Thus Platonic Idea is still representation though space, time, and causality do not apply to it.

Quote

"On the other hand, the Platonic Idea is necessarily object, something known, a representation, and precisely, but only, in this respect is it different from the thing-in-itself. It has laid aside merely the subordinate forms of the phenomenon, all of which include under the principle of sufficient reason; or rather it has not yet entered into them. But it has retained the first and most universal form, namely that of the representation in general, that of being object for a subject.

[Mr. Veech]

@ ToALonelyPeace

In order to demonstrate that Schopenhauer is "guilty" of inconsistency, I'll need to show that he maintains the following:

(1) The principle of individuation is determined by space and time.

(2) The Platonic Ideas exist outside space and time.

The end result will be that the Ideas themselves are not subjected to the principle of individuation, which means that Schopenhauer's overall aesthetic theory is essentially "forced" in between his epistemology and his metaphysics. The fact that he reiterates Berkeley's claim that every subject has an object throughout WWR has no bearing on the issue at hand. The Ideas are "representations," but they are not governed by the principle of individuation. The latter, not the former, is the problem. Schopenhauer wishes to retain the subject/object relation in order to explain aesthetic contemplation simply because he believes the subject of knowing is always present.

I just now noticed your post. Sadly, I have to prepare for work, but I'll post at least two relevant passages later on today which corroborate the above.

[EmptyAutomata]

If we consider the significant amount of people who nowadays cease to reproduce in order to not inflict pain on others human beings, yeah, Antinatalism is such an expansive movement right now. Following the main conceptions about this ideology exposed by David Benatar -which I think he's fairly on point about the implications on having children no matter if the individual identifies itself as a philanthropic or a misanthropic person- the crucial point here is located between the philosophical question related to the human extinction and how it affects to the rest of biological beings, even the cosmos itself.
I'd like to see this kind of way like an opportunity to reconsider the human condition and advocate to a more deeper meaning of what can do those who are alive to confront this circumstance

[ToALonelyPeace]

Quote Originally Posted by Mr. Veech

@ ToALonelyPeace In order to demonstrate that Schopenhauer is "guilty" of inconsistency, I'll need to show that he maintains the following: (1) The principle of individuation is determined by space and time. (2) The Platonic Ideas exist outside space and time. The end result will be that the Ideas themselves are not subjected to the principle of individuation, which means that Schopenhauer's overall aesthetic theory is essentially "forced" in between his epistemology and his metaphysics. The fact that he reiterates Berkeley's claim that every subject has an object throughout WWR has no bearing on the issue at hand. The Ideas are "representations," but they are not governed by the principle of individuation. The latter, not the former, is the problem. Schopenhauer wishes to retain the subject/object relation in order to explain aesthetic contemplation simply because he believes the subject of knowing is always present. I just now noticed your post. Sadly, I have to prepare for work, but I'll post at least two relevant passages later on today which corroborate the above.

Thank you, please elaborate it if you can. Do you mean there's an inconsistency in the relation of phenomenon of an Idea and the Idea? or in how Platonic Ideas exist outside time and space but they are individuated from one another?

If it's the latter, can it be called an inconsistency? Schopenhauer views an Idea as an original force of nature. There are different forces, but ultimately they all belong in the same category of force.

[Ibrahim]

Before we can prove that something exists outside of space and time, shouldn't we first establish that things exist within space and time?
I'm not kidding; i know these -time, space- are just abstractions, and not ( i hope ) descriptive, but nevertheless, is it helpful to the general argument to see time containing anything or space being around anything?

[Mr. Veech]

@ ToALonelyPeace

Here are two passages (or sources) which corroborate (1). The first comes from Book II of WWR (Payne's Dover translation). The second is a scholarly secondary source (via link).

"We know that plurality in general is necessarily conditioned by time and space, and only in these is conceivable, and in this respect we call them the principium individuationis. But we have recognized time and space as forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and in this principle all our knowledge a priori is expressed." (pp. 127-128)

Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauers Philosophy - David E. Cartwright - Google Books

Evidence for (2) comes from the very opening of Book III, although numerous other passages reiterate the same thing:

"In all these forms we recognize only the different aspects of the principle of sufficient reason that is the ultimate principle of all finiteness, of all individuation, and the universal form of the representation as it comes to the knowledge of the individual as such. On the other hand, the Idea does not enter into that principle; hence neither plurality nor change belongs to it. While the individuals in which it expresses itself are innumerable and are incessantly coming into existence and passing away, it remains unchanged as one and the same, and the principle of sufficent reason has no meaning for it." (pg. 169)

As you know, the principle of individuation only pertains to the principle of sufficient reason. So, Schopenhauer is not, given the philosophical parameters that he himself established, permitted to claim that there exists an "intermediate" realm occupied by Platonic Ideas. The only plausible explanation I can think of regarding this conspicuous aspect of his philosophy is that WWR was written by a brilliant yet stubborn (and youthful) individual.

[Mr. Veech]

Quote Originally Posted by Ibrahim

Before we can prove that something exists outside of space and time, shouldn't we first establish that things exist within space and time? I'm not kidding; i know these -time, space- are just abstractions, and not ( i hope ) descriptive, but nevertheless, is it helpful to the general argument to see time containing anything or space being around anything?

Well, the contemporary scientific view is that space and time are not receptacles. They were for Newton, but they are not so according to Einstein's general relativity. Space and time are not separate "things;" they are an intrinsic feature of matter.

I apologize. I've derailed this entire thread.

[ToALonelyPeace]

@Mr Veech: You're right. What he says on pg 169 explicitly contradicts with what he says on pg 175 in which he states:

Quote

Therefore the principle of sufficient reason is again the form into which the Idea enters, since the Idea comes into the knowledge of the subject as individual.

Maybe what Schopenhauer means on pg 169 -plurality does not apply to the Idea- is from perspective of the will. The will's one objectivity is the Idea. From perspective of the representation, plurality does apply to the Idea.

It's very strange how he didn't bother to reread 6 pages back what he wrote.