David Benatar (Antinatalism) v Jordan Peterson

[Acutely decayed]

Quote Originally Posted by Acutely decayed

Quote Originally Posted by paeng For some strange reason, it reminds me of Pascal's wager.

and Anselm's argument - it irritates me the same way like grit to an oyster - actually all these ontological arguments (thank god I am a scientist and not a philosopher)

[cannibal cop]

Quote Originally Posted by Ibrahim

Quote Originally Posted by cannibal cop Quote Originally Posted by Ibrahim These are not qualities of the absence. To the person who is affected by them, they are, or can be said to be, at the very least. ...also, there was no person, was there?

Well, there was and there wasn't, if you're talking about the asymmetry argument. And in that case, I shouldn't be speaking up for it since I don't find it especially convincing either.

I think maybe its main flaw as an argument for antinatalism is that it brings up this idea of "pleasure" in the first place, as if it in some way might provide a justification for the suffering of life. As any antinatalist knows, at best pleasure can to some degree make life bearable, or make it seem bearable, anyway, for brief periods. But it is in no way an adequate compensation for life's pain, and the possibility of pleasure in no way justifies being forced to endure that pain.

In any case, people produce offspring generally for their own pleasure first and foremost. Any thought for the fate of the child is usually along the lines of "Hope for the best" and let God sort it out. And of course, once a person exists it is too late for any such considerations.

[Ibrahim]

Quote Originally Posted by Mr. Veech

The concerns you have about the "impersonal" mirror Cabrera's own concerns about Benatar's asymmetry argument. Cabrera claims that Benatar equivocates when using counterfactuals to demonstrate the asymmetry between pain and pleasure when it comes to their absence. If, according to Cabrera, one is consistent with the use of counterfactuals, then the symmetry between pain and pleasure is restored. I'm not sure how to attach a PDF file, but you can find his paper entitled "Quality of Human Life and Non-Existence" online. If you read it, we can discuss it at a later time.

Found it, read it. Yes, that's about what i was grasping at, i think, although i'm wary of saying so because Cabrera seems to use his refutation of the asymmetry argument to support his own argument later...
which is of course no less an antinatalist one...

[Mr. Veech]

Quote Originally Posted by Ibrahim

Quote Originally Posted by Mr. Veech The concerns you have about the "impersonal" mirror Cabrera's own concerns about Benatar's asymmetry argument. Cabrera claims that Benatar equivocates when using counterfactuals to demonstrate the asymmetry between pain and pleasure when it comes to their absence. If, according to Cabrera, one is consistent with the use of counterfactuals, then the symmetry between pain and pleasure is restored. I'm not sure how to attach a PDF file, but you can find his paper entitled "Quality of Human Life and Non-Existence" online. If you read it, we can discuss it at a later time. Found it, read it. Yes, that's about what i was grasping at, i think, although i'm wary of saying so because Cabrera seems to use his refutation of the asymmetry argument to support his own argument later... which is of course no less an antinatalist one...

Cabrera is an antinatalist, but his approach is ontological. He claims that because life involves the process of dying (what he calls "structural death"), it's morally wrong to bestow life on others. Structural death also precludes the possibility of anyone living the "good life" according to Cabrera.

Anyone who's studied Heidegger's early work (Being and Time) can easily grasp the core of Cabrera's philosophy - at least I'm very confident that that's so. It will be interesting to see how he handles Heidegger's claim that acknowledgment of one's own death as a real possibility is what enables one to live authentically. Death is a "structural" feature of the human condition for both Heidegger and Cabrera, but the latter is more concerned with its ethical implications.
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@ cannibal cop

To be fair, Benatar's asymmetry argument can be formulated in terms of "harms" and "benefits." He actually does this in Better Never to Have Been. He tries to demonstrate that the asymmetry itself goes beyond a hedonistic approach to the problem of procreation.

[cannibal cop]

Harms and benefits. That makes things much clearer. Benefits of existence? Absolute zero. Harms of existence? Unlimited and more or less constant; for argument's sake, let's say infinite. For nonexistence these totals can simply be switched around.

So this way the asymmetry argument achieves perfect symmetry. A kind of magic square of misery.